ABSTRACT In this article I argue that in Parsons' later works there is an implicit alternative to his normative solution to the problem of order. Luhmann's theory of self-reference and Pizzorno's notion of mutual identification are firstly invoked to recast the Parsonsian problematic in a 'post-normative' light. On the basis of Parsons' later theory of societal solidarity, ritual and myth, I propose further that his concept of symbolic communication of affect delineates the process through which individuals recognize each other and thereby constitute social order. Mediated with symbols that are grounded in the human condition, communication of affect may substitute institutionalization of value to be the condition of possibility of social order. I also demonstrate that the significance of affect is a theme shared by the Chinese tradition of Confucianism, which is introduced to refine the humanistic intent of Parsons' theory and broaden its scope of applicability outside the Western context. KEYWORDS affect, Confucianism, double contingency, human condition, mutual identification, self-reference, social order It would hardly be an exaggeration to assert that Talcott Parsons inaugurates the terms of debate for the problem of social order. No matter whether one concurs or disputes with his normative solution, in tackling with the problem of order one must always clarify one's own position with explicit or implicit reference to it. Not only was this the case in the 1960s, when competing paradigms were at pains to articulate their distinctive visions of social order vis-à-vis that of structural functionalism (see, e.g., Blumer, 1962; Dahrendorf, 1968; Homans, 1961) , but the dialogue with Parsons also continues right up to the present, when theories of order continue the search for a viable alternative to his normative solution.
Such is the case for rational choice theory and symbolic interactionism, which reject the normative solution on the common ground that it begs the question of the emergence of norm at the micro-level of rational action or social interaction (for rational choice theory see Coleman, 1990; Hechter, 1987; Horne, 2003 ; for symbolic interactionism see Goffman, 1983; Garfinkel, 1988; Rawls, 1987) . But more often than not these theories turn out to presuppose the normative and institutional order they purport to explain (Elster, 1989: 125; Habermas, 1984 Habermas, , 1987 Zafirovski, 2000) .
For those more sympathetic with Parsons, one prominent strategy is to elaborate upon his structural-functional theory of social system and further specify the institutional and motivational dynamics underlying social order (Kaye, 1991; Turner, 1997; Wrong, 1994) . A more ambitious approach is to capitalize on the early Parsons, in particular his classic The Structure of Social Action (1937) , for the construction of an encompassing framework under which all theories of social order could be subsumed, integrated and transcended (Alexander, 1982a (Alexander, , 1982b (Alexander, , 1983a (Alexander, , 1983b Lockwood, 1992) . But the proposed synthesis often tends to remain abstract and fails to propound a viable alternative paradigm. The 'strong program' of cultural sociology advocated by Alexander, for instance, bears doubtful continuity with his original multidimensional theory (Alexander and Smith, 1998) . Notwithstanding its inadequacies, therefore, no alternative to the normative solution has been thus far convincingly established.
Such an obscure scenario suggests that a more radical critique of the Parsonsian problem of order is necessitated if an epistemological break with its normativistic framework is to be unambiguously effected. Is it possible to reformulate the problem at a more generalized level, at which cultural values and norms assume a mere derivative rather than constitutive status with regard to the condition of possibility of social order? In this vein my preliminary objective in this article is to introduce two thoroughgoing critiques of the Parsonsian problematic, which are nevertheless given scant attention in existing literature. They consist in Luhmann's reformulation of Parsons' notion of double contingency in terms of self-reference, and Pizzorno's reinterpretation of the Hobbesian problem of order in terms of mutual identification. Both these critical positions are radical in the sense that they altogether delineate a hypothetical yet theoretically instructive situation in which no values and norms could be presumed to be readily existent or unproblematically emerged. Rather, a specific social process must be initiated before any normative structure and social order could be founded and perpetuated. A discussion of the notions of self-reference and mutual identification is thus intended to recast the prevalent treatment of the problem of order in a way that may effectively forestall the post festum fallacy plaguing the worn-out normativistic framework as well as its inadequate rational-choice and symbolicinteractionist correctives.
But while these notions are serviceable in problematizing the selfconstituting nature of social order and its anchorage in the mutual identification of individuals, they nevertheless beg a crucial question: how is the self-constitution of social order and its constituent individuals possible in the first place, especially if it could not be taken to rest upon any pre-given normative element? In this regard I will seek to demonstrate that, somewhat paradoxically, the notion of symbolic communication of affect in Parsons' own later works could serve to delineate the process through which social order is constituted at the level of action system. At this generalized level all elements of social order, in particular moral values, contribute to social solidarity not by virtue of their institutionalization, but rather in their articulation with the symbols by which individual actors communicate their affective identification with each other. These symbolic media of affect are in turn rooted in the human condition itself, such that the selfconstitution of social order consists in the continual valorization of the potential capacity of its constituent human actors to communicate affect symbolically. The feasibility of a 'post-normative' solution to the problem of order thus hinges upon whether a 'humanistic' alternative could be coherently and convincingly articulated, which I propose is possible on the basis of the conceptual resources in the Parsonsian edifice itself.
In broad outline, therefore, I will undertake the following tasks in this article: (1) to clarify Luhmann's critique of the Parsonsian problem of order in terms of his theory of self-referential social system; (2) to criticize in turn the Luhmannian critique on the basis of Pizzorno's reinterpretation of the Hobbesian problem of order, which proposes that the self-referential constitution of social order is possible only through the mutual identification of human individuals; and (3) to pinpoint the relevance of Parsons' notion of affect to the process of mutual identification and thereby the constitution of social order. In validating symbolic communication of affect as an alternative solution to the problem of order, I will suggest that it could be further elucidated and elaborated in light of the humanistic tradition of Chinese Confucianism. The implications of the Parsonsian perspective thus reconstructed on the analysis of modern social order will then be tentatively drawn.
Luhmann: From Norm and Value to Self-reference
The notion of double contingency will occupy a strategic role in our ensuing analysis, for it is essentially the peculiar conceptualization of the problem of order in Parsons' system-theoretical terms. While Parsons' normative solution has been the standard object of attack in virtually any treatment of the subject matter, there are surprisingly few serious attempts to trace the solution back to his specific way of formulating the problem. More often than not it is taken as a simple duplication of the Hobbesian problem of order. The incapability of mainstream theories of social order to go beyond the normativistic paradigm may have at least partly to do with such deficient reconsideration of the entire Parsonsian problematic. In this regard Luhmann's theory of self-reference is instructive in its being an immanent critique of the Parsonsian problem of order, which goes to the root of its fundamental premises and in this way sheds considerable light upon how a genuine break with the normative solution is possible.
According to Parsons, double contingency refers to the indeterminate situation arising from the general interdependence among interacting actors. In a simplified, dyadic model of interaction between ego and alter, ego's action is not only oriented to his or her expectation of that of alter, but also to alter's expectation of his or her own action. The same is true on the side of alter. A problem of complementarity of expectations thus results (Parsons and Shils, 1951: 15-16 ). Double contingency is therefore the indeterminacy of action that arises as 'each actor is both acting agent and object of orientation both to himself and to the others' (Parsons, 1977a: 167) . Without resolving this elemental indeterminacy, social interaction could never occur and the constitution of social order could never be possible. It is at this juncture that Parsons proposes his normative solution: action orientations (read: not merely utilitarian self-interests but any possible sources of motivation) could be coordinated with each other only through the institutionalization and internalization of shared normative standards (Parsons, 1951: 11-2 ).
Luhmann's critique of the Parsonsian problem of order is based upon his notion of self-reference, which refers to an operation that is entirely for itself and is independent of the operations and observations by others (Luhmann, 1995: 33) . A self-referential system is entirely for itself in the sense that it presupposes nothing external to itself in the constitution of its own elements and thereby of itself (Luhmann, 1995: 21) . In other words the constitution of a self-referential system does not involve a selection of pre-constituted elements that eventually enter into relationship with each other; rather it is only through the constitution of the system as a whole that its elements are produced.
Accordingly an adequate solution to the problem of order must account for the emergence of social system out of no pre-existent value, norm and indeed meaning, which is conceived by Luhmann as the element of social system qua communication system. In this vein, double contingency is generalized from a problem of action coordination into one of meaning determination, which arises when ego and alter experience each other as a 'black box' that eludes access from the outside but nevertheless find it necessary to refer to each other in determining the meaning of their respective behavior, be it action or experience (Luhmann, 1995: 109-14) . Under such a situation any determination of meaning on the basis of an expectation towards the behavior of the other would be immediately reflected back upon oneself and as such remain indeterminate. Social order would be possible only if such an indeterminate circle could be broken (Luhmann, 1995: 117) . 1 A radical implication would then follow: as the formation of a selfreferential social system could owe to nothing external to itself, it is possible only if the situation of double contingency contains within itself its very solution. It is possible because, despite their opacity to each other, ego and alter nevertheless share an identical experience of double contingency as a situation common to both. With this shared experience, however, both ego and alter would be sufficiently motivated to end the indeterminate and intolerable situation by achieving meaning determination despite an incomplete grasp of its complexity. Such a circumstance would be highly open and sensitive to chance or noise, that is, any self-determination of meaning on the part of either ego or alter that could reduce the complexity of the whole situation by opening up the possibility to connect with further determinations. In constituting the unity of the whole situation as doubly contingent, the circularly enclosed structure of double contingency is highly conducive to the formation of social system and the constitution of social order. As any selection of meaning on the part of ego is localized at a definite point of time, it could be readily connected with a successive selection on the part of alter (Luhmann, 1995: 118-22) .
Double contingency is thus reduced by a temporal difference that asymmetrizes and breaks open the circularly closed ego-alter constellation. A temporal rather than social solution is offered to the problem of order: into the place of norm and value is substituted time and contingency as the basis of social order (Luhmann, 1995: 124-5) . Instead of assuming a pre-existing normative order that is itself to be explained, social system could emerge entirely out of no foundation but itself:
No preordained value consensus is needed; the problem of double contingency draws in chance straightaway, creates sensitivity to chance, and when no value consensus exists, one can thereby invent it. The system emerges etsi no daretur Deus [even if God doesn't exist]. (Luhmann, 1995: 105) But once the formation of social system is initiated, a normative structure of expectations that exercises control over the scope of behavior of both ego and alter would be developed and stabilized. Whether the actors conform to or deviate from normative expectations is, however, out of the question; what is required for the maintenance of social order is solely the constant regeneration of double contingency as a definite problem of conformity versus deviance for the actors to interpret and handle. Against a definition of the situation in terms of the difference between consensus and dissent, ego could readily react to the compliance or deviance of alter and vice versa. While it is always possible to fall short of expectations, a deviant act or experience is nevertheless understandable and meaningful within the horizon of social system (Luhmann, 1995: 132-3) .
For Luhmann, therefore, the possible role or function of institutionalized norms and values in the constitution of social order resides merely in their regeneration of difference or double contingency vis-à-vis a stabilized structure of expectations. By virtue of its self-resolution and self-regeneration, the situation of double contingency constitutes by itself the very basis of social order. No further preconditions that supposedly guarantee the conformity to expected courses of action on the parts of ego and alter are necessary for the constitution of social order. Rather self-reference implies that any difference, normatively articulated or not, suffices to generate and regenerate social order. While norms and values are conceded a certain place in the making of social order, Luhmann in effect transcends the normativistic framework by conceiving these normative elements as meaningful differences and accordingly relativizing them to the self-reference of social system.
Pizzorno: From Self-reference to Mutual Identification
Luhmann's notion of self-reference thus radically reorients our treatment of the problem of order in theorizing the possibility of social order to emerge even under a vacuity of preordained value and norm. But there is a serious potential drawback to this approach. In suggesting that any given difference between individuals could readily lead to the formation of social system, Luhmann is indeed running the risk of canceling the problem of order altogether. While the self-referential constitution of social order is held to be a contingent result of articulating a meaningful schema of difference in concrete processes of communication, a nontautological criterion that specifies when and whether a given schema would be successful in leading to the emergence of social order is still by and large lacking.
To further specify the condition of possibility of order without, however, falling back on Parsons' normative solution requires us to penetrate even deeper than Luhmann into the blind spot of the entire Parsonsian problematic. Here a major source of inspiration comes from Pizzorno's (1991) reinterpretation of the Hobbesian problem of order, from which the Parsonsian counterpart is generalized in the first place. In seeking to disentangle the Hobbesian problem from the narrowly rationalistic and individualistic framework attributed to it by Parsons' interpretive account in The Structure of Social Action, Pizzorno in effect suggests a way out of the impasse entrapping the Parsonsian theory of order as well as all subsequent theorizing influenced by it, including Luhmann's otherwise critical reformulation.
According to Pizzorno, the minimal condition of social order, for Hobbes as for any other theorists, should be that human beings could preserve themselves and maintain their survivals. Self-preservation, however, is not conceived by Hobbes (pace Parsons and the conventional understanding stamped by him) in terms of the utilitarian category of desire, want or any pre-articulated self-interest. Rather, the constitution of self-interests (and their ensuing conflict) begs the question of the constitution of 'self' bearing these interests, and self-constitution in turn is possible only with a mutual recognition of human beings (Pizzorno, 1991: 219) . 2 In the 'state of nature', in which no naturally pre-constituted interests and pre-existing arrangement of social cooperation could be presumed, human beings could not recognize each other as a person who would stay the same, or in other words exhibit a durable identity and consistent choice of words and actions, throughout their interaction over time. They could not count on each other as a reliable partner in the interaction game because each of them still does not constitute a recognizable and identifiable self. In such a situation human beings would tend to stay away from each other and lead a solitary, impoverished life; or else a 'war of all against all' would result from their general mistrust of each other (Pizzorno, 1991: 214-15) .
The underlying assumption here is that human beings are not selfsufficient in constructing their selves and identities; rather, they are dependent upon each other for recognizing themselves as 'worth preserving', that is, as identifiable individuals entitled to participate in interaction (Pizzorno, 1991: 219) . Hence only with mutual recognition could human beings begin to conceive of themselves as individuals whose identities and patterns of choice endure over time, and only thus could a relationship of trust be developed between them. The possibilities of 'force and fraud' in the state of nature, as well as the 'prisoner dilemma' involved, must be effectively prevented as these momentous acts would deprive the individuals of the mutual identification that endows and preserves their identities in the first place (Pizzorno, 1991: 220) .
Along this line of thought, the problem of order could be further generalized from a problem of meaning constitution into one of constitution of the individual as the bearer of a relatively stable pattern of meaning. According to this reinterpretation, the single most fundamental condition of social order is mutual identification, through which human beings are constituted as individuals with relatively stable identities. The constituted individuals could then be endowed with names (such as 'mom') prescribing their roles (mother), sanctioned by norms of behavior (childrearing), and identified with institutions (family) that maintain the boundaries of their identities by defining and enforcing these roles and norms (Pizzorno, 1991: 220) . In particular the existence of social order is secured by the Leviathan or the State, which is the political institution with which individuals are identified as citizens (Pizzorno, 1991: 223) . But despite all these possible further specifications of social order, mutual identification remains as the elementary process underlying its constitution. The function of this process is to attribute complexes of action to individuals, who are thereby constituted as subjects identical in time and authorized as actors responsible for their own actions in the preservation or disruption of social order (Pizzorno, 1991: 221) .
At this point Pizzorno's reinterpretation may serve to illuminate a blind spot shared by both Parsons and Luhmann. While radical in displacing the constitutive role of norm and value to the self-constituting operations of social system, Luhmann does not indeed go far enough to relativize the latter to the contingent, mutual constitution of individuals under the situation of double contingency. To the extent that the Cartesian assumption of an interior and inward-looking self is carried over (albeit modified) in the conceptualization of the human individual as a self-regulating personality system, a reified conception of social system as a realm decoupled from its constituent individuals would inevitably result, no matter whether its constitutive core is attributed to institutionalized values or to 'itself'.
The primary consideration here is that ego and alter cannot be presumed to experience each other as an identifiable self or system in the first place, not even as a black box. Mutual identification would never be possible if both of them are oriented merely to their respective self-determination of meaning. In such a case the situation of double contingency, in much the same way as the 'state of nature', would be experienced by both ego and alter, albeit only respectively or singly. Even as double contingency is an intrinsic and persistent feature of social encounter, without mutual recognition ego could never ascertain (nor could s/he ascertain that s/he is uncertain) that an identical experience of double contingency is shared by alter or not. At a deeper level, ego cannot even ascertain that an alter exists. What is experienced from the subjective point of view would be rather a contingent, yet undifferentiated, environment encountered by its being a solitary ego.
In more general terms, insofar as the problem of order is reduced from one concerning the double contingency arising from the reciprocity (or 'intersubjectivity') of meaning selection to one concerning the single contingency that arises from the self-referential, indeterminate circle of selection in social encounter, the conditions under which the meaning determination on its respective sides becomes oriented to each other would remain unproblematic. With the mere presence of 'difference', the course of communication would be highly susceptible to disruption rather than perpetuation. On the basis of Pizzorno's argument, we may suggest that if mutual identification is unattainable, there would not be sufficient motivation on the part of individuals to initiate a relationship with each other at all. Rather, they would prefer to stand alone and lead a solitary life in the presence of unidentifiable others. Under this circumstance the self-determination on the respective part is not so much to elicit a response from each other as to get rid of the burden of expecting a response altogether. Both are overwhelmed by the complexity arising from the failure of mutual identification, and thereby refrain from entering into communication and instead fashion themselves as 'black boxes'. They may stay away from or even destroy each other, both being selections or 'differences' that nevertheless result in the de facto failure of communication.
What analytical results could be yielded from the critiques of the problem of double contingency hitherto considered? Concerning the problem formulation, it is demonstrated that the core problematic of double contingency does not merely entail the coordination of action orientations or even meaning horizons, but rather the identification of those very human individuals who come to bear these orientations and horizons in the first place. Accordingly, the resolution of double contingency could not be taken to inhere in any preconceived structure of norm and value or any notion of difference that does not incorporate within itself the specific conditions under which there arises sufficient motivation for individuals to engage in mutual identification. Rather, a genuinely 'post-normative' solution of the problem of social order has to be sought in a humanistic direction, for which the condition of possibility of social order is conceived as residing in the human actors themselves.
Granted that Pizzorno and Luhmann altogether contribute to a thoroughgoing reformulation of the Parsonsian problem of order, a fundamental problem nevertheless remains: how is mutual identification possible? More specifically, how is it possible to conceive of human individuals as potentially capable of initiating and engaging in mutual identification among themselves, without assuming any preordained notion of 'natural disposition to sympathy' (à la the Scottish enlightenment), metaphysical 'reason' (à la Locke), transcendentally conceived cultural value (à la Parsons) or phenomenologically given difference (à la Luhmann)? In other words, it requires us to pinpoint how social order could be envisioned as a contingent accomplishment of the spontaneous (though not disembedded) initiative and engagement of human individuals to identify among themselves, instead of any possible sort of a priori, abstract categories set over and apart from these individuals.
Communication of Affect in the Later Parsons The Affective Foundation of Societal Solidarity
In this and the following sections I will purport to demonstrate that there is a process specifically relevant to the identification and constitution of individuals and thereby to the constitution of social order. It refers to the symbolic communication of affect, a notion that receives particular attention in the later works of Parsons and yet remains unarticulated in its general-theoretical implications on the problem of order.
The concept of affect is intended above all by the later Parsons to pinpoint the condition of societal integration and solidarity. In his major work on the evolution of the modern system of societies (Parsons, 1971 , see also Parsons, 1966) , the integration of society in general is analyzed in terms of its core structure of societal community, which consists in a system of normative and institutional complexes that function to maintain solidarity among members of the society as a whole. The integration of modern society, for instance, resides above all in its institution of citizenship, system of legal norms and civic associations (Parsons, 1971: 18-26) . The normative and institutional order of societal community could perform this integrative function by virtue of its definition of rules and regulations governing social membership, that is, by prescribing and sanctioning the rights and obligations that are to be expected from the social members.
In his further studies of modern social order, however, Parsons proceeds from the level of normative and institutional order to that of human action in general, at which the problem of rationality and motivation comes to the forefront (Parsons, 1971: 143) . The major assumption underlying this conceptual move is that institutional and normative structure is not self-sufficient in maintaining solidarity among social members; rather, it must presuppose a motivational foundation in their system of action in general. More specifically, the structural analysis of societal community begs the question of the source of loyalty and commitment of its members, which in turn impinges upon the problem of their self-identification as the members of the societal community and their willingness to engage and participate in collective life in the first place. With much the same logic as Pizzorno's argument, for which social solidarity presupposes relatively stable loci of social identity, in Parsons' technical rendering the integration of social system presupposes integration at the level of general action system, at which social system constitutes merely one of its subsystems among others. At this generalized level the condition of social solidarity consists in the integration and interchange among action subsystems, in which symbolically mediated communication of affect assumes a pivotal significance.
As a psychoanalytic concept adopted from Freud, affect is nevertheless identified by Parsons as a symbolic medium anchored in social system, which is the integrative subsystem of the general action system. Here the symbolic and social (rather than psychological and biological) reference of affect resides in its function of mediating the association and identification of individuals (Parsons and Platt, 1973: 83-4) . The prototype of an affective social relationship is kinship tie, which involves, for Parsons, not so much a purely erotic relationship as a diffuse and enduring solidarity among kin members (Parsons, 1977c: 252-3) . Though organically based, the sex and blood ties in kinship furnish the primordial symbols of affection that express, constitute and stabilize the solidarity of the group as well as the identity of its constituent members. But affective relationship is not limited to kinship tie; rather, it could be extended to any voluntarily formed collectivity or association.
In this regard the ascriptive element of kinship is less salient than its associational element, which is manifested above all in the 'contract' of marriage. In general, it is only through symbolically mediated communication of affect that the normative and institutional order of societal community could be endowed with affective meanings, such that a genuine and authentic solidary group, with which individuals identify themselves as its voluntary fellow members, could be constituted (Parsons and Platt, 1973: 84) .
In this light, affect can be defined as a symbol being communicated in social interaction that constitutes and re-constitutes the identities of its participants as the members of a solidary collectivity. This symbol must be emotionally charged and relevant to the motivational balance of individuals with regard to their membership in and loyalty to the collectivity. Accordingly, this element is analytically distinct from institutionalized norms and values, which concern not so much the formation of identity and solidarity per se as the implementation of membership rules in action as well as the differentiation of levels of influence or prestige among classes of members (Parsons, 1971: 14) .
Hence, while Parsons argues that the communication of affect as a rule proceeds under a moral framework, social identification and association are nevertheless held to be accomplished in and through the very process of affective communication. In other words, moral authority is indispensable in, and only in, sanctioning affective relationships, such that its role in the formation of social order should be regulative rather than constitutive. It would be tantamount to claiming that, for the later Parsons, affect assumes the integrative significance that was formerly accorded to values and norms. The problem of social order is no longer simply one of conformity to institutionalized norms and values; rather, it becomes a problem of moral sanctioning of affective commitment to groups and associations in societal community.
But the above statements have to be carefully qualified. Parsons repeatedly stresses that affect could not be taken as the sole empirical condition of social solidarity. While communication of affect could always contribute to the association and identification of individuals, it does not necessarily entail their identification with a relatively stable institutional and normative order. As Parsons and Platt put it, Solidarity is the institutional stabilization of affectively toned relations of association and identification. The distinction between influence as a generalized medium at the social system level and affect at the general action level is that the use of influence presumes institutionalized solidarity, whereas the use of affect does not.
( 1973: 83) In other words, affect, as a symbolic medium pertaining to the level of action system, is not necessarily institutionalized in social system to constitute a relatively stable bond of solidarity transcending the spontaneous, interpersonal level of communication. As the motivational basis of social solidarity, affect must be complemented with the moral basis of the cultural system, which consists in value and more generally a definition of a situation that prescribes and defines the mutual obligations in an affective relationship (Parsons, 1978c: 318) . While, at the level of action system, affective communication and social identification are possible without a moral sanctioning of reciprocal obligations, the social order thus constituted would be highly unstable and limited in scope owing to its lack of institutionalization (Parsons and Platt, 1973: 440) .
Such institutional emphasis is of course related to the social and cultural context in which the later Parsons set forth his theory of affect, which was intended as a critical response to over-radicalized student protest and the unregulated practice of free sex and drug abuse in the American hippie movement. Despite his stress on the need of institutionalization to check and balance the excess of this movement and prevent it from running into unrealistic and deadend utopianism, Parsons is generally supportive of the social and cultural trend towards expressivity, to the extent that he sees in it the emergence of a 'religion of love' that is the modern, secularized heir to the Christian tradition (Parsons, 1978d: 253-63) . The theme of love as manifested in this movement becomes so significant to Parsons that it does not merely signify the advent of a new phase of 'expressive revolution' in modernization (Parsons, 1978c: 320-2 ; see also Turner and Robertson, 1991: 257) , but also exercises a profound impact upon his general conception of social solidarity.
Here a critique of Parsons' original normative solution to order is implicit in his theory of affect. Notwithstanding the imperative of moral sanctioning, what is being institutionalized in social system is affect rather than value per se. In other words, the constitutive element of the social system is its institutionalized affective relationship rather than value standard, which should be more properly conceived as belonging to the cultural system. 3 The efficacy of value and norm in the provision of social order now resides exclusively in its regulation and legitimization of the affective relationships that are constitutive of social system (Parsons, 1977c: 253) . While a solidary social relationship has to be always morally sanctioned, it is affective in nature. To put it bluntly, the structure of social system should be institutionalized affect rather than value.
Closely related to this point is the idea that the maintenance of institutional and normative order now necessitates not so much internalization of value per se as communication of affect. Affective attachment is no longer conceived merely as the mechanism of family socialization, a means through which societal values are introjected into personality structure (Parsons, 1964; Parsons and Bales, 1955 ; see also Kaye, 1991: 99-102) ; rather, the maintenance of affective relationship constitutes in itself the locus of the ongoing communicative process in society at large.
Parsons' conceptualization of affect as the symbolic element of social system thus rests upon the recognition that the operation of social system follows a logic or rationality different from that of the cultural system and personality system. Affect does not operate according to the 'code' or standard of valuerationality grounded in moral authority; nor does it follow the standard of goalrationality relevant to personal success. Rather, its operative principle is integrative rationality, which consists in the social imperative of harmonizing the identities of social members (Parsons and Platt, 1973: 446) . Here the notion of integrative rationality refers to both social harmony in the Confucian sense and universal love in the Christian sense (Parsons, 1977c: 268) .
It implies that, for Parsons, the condition of social integration has become a problem concerned directly with the process of affective communication, in which the 'rational' or harmonious allocation of affect by individuals to different collectivities is problematic. In general-theoretical terms, the significance of affect lies in its integration of the 'factors of solidarity' in the other action subsystems to generate and regenerate social solidarity. These factors include moral sanctioning of social or 'associational' membership from the cultural system, cathectic commitment to membership from the personality system, as well as cognitive appraisal of membership status from the behavioral system (Parsons, 1977c: 266; see also Parsons, 1977b: 219-20) . These factors interchange and interpenetrate with each other through the communication of affect to constitute a system of solidary relationship, in which individuals come to be identified and constituted as the members of the societal community. In other words, while affect alone cannot generate and secure solidarity and identification at a societal level, the factors of solidarity from other action subsystems must acquire affective significance in order to constitute social solidarity and identity.
To round up this part of our discussion, several characteristics of affect can be highlighted. Above all it is the symbolic and motivational (rather than institutional) basis of solidarity in societal community. Its function is to render identification and association of individuals possible by eliciting and harmonizing their emotional commitment and loyalty to membership in different collectivities. Its status is sociological rather than narrowly social-psychological, for it concerns not only interpersonal solidarity but also its possible extension to the societal level. Affect is expressive rather than merely erotic: it always refers to a social relationship that must be nevertheless built upon an erotic base of motivation. It is 'rational' but not value-rational or goal-rational: its rationality is neither the integrity of value or cultural standards nor the instrumental attainment of personal goals and wants, but rather the identification and integration of individual members in social system. This integrative rationality consists above all in the imperative of generalizing or extending affective attachment from primary to secondary groups, which is nevertheless always possibly met with the irrational, 'fundamentalist' regression to parochial and exotic solidary relationship.
Ritual, Myth and the Human Condition
But insofar as the communication of affect is analyzed exclusively with reference to its grounding of institutional and normative order at the level of social system, the generalizability of affect as the condition of possibility of social order remains restricted by the level of its institutionalization and, as in the case of any media of interchange, the level of social differentiation (Parsons, 1977c: 262) . In this way the functional significance of affect tends to be confined to modern society, in which affective ties are structurally differentiated from ascriptive collectivities and generalized to voluntary and civic associations (Parsons, 1977c: 252-3) .
But, as we have noted, communication of affect is not necessarily institutionalized at the level of social system. The instability of non-institutionalized affect is problematic insofar as the analytical focus is confined to the repercussion of the dynamics of the action system upon the institutionalization of social system. As the analytical level is further generalized from action system to human condition system, at which the former constitutes merely one of the latter's subsystems, the problem of institutionalization of affect becomes largely irrelevant and is displaced by the problem of constitution of meaning and human individual. The analytical focus would be the source and grounding of symbols, in particular the symbols of affect, in the human condition. At this level the problem of social order ceases to be one concerning the constitution of society in the narrow sense of social system; rather, it concerns the constitution of social system as the internal environment of human action (Parsons, 1978a: 221-3) . In this regard, an unstable, non-institutionalized affective relationship serves as the very source of solidarity of 'society', in the generalized sense of an action system.
Parsons suggests that ritual and myth (in Lévi-Strauss' sense) constitute two such non-institutionalized modes of communication of affect that generate and renew social solidarity at the level of action system. While these two categories have long been identified by Durkheim as the sacred and moral basis of social order, Parsons' theoretical intervention is significant in its problematization of the affective nature of these categories.
For the late Parsons, ritual is essentially a symbolic act of affection. It serves to integrate individuals with each other by arousing their emotion and directing it to the sacred objects of society. The psychological excitement or effervescence in ritual is not a spontaneous outbreak of emotion, but rather a symbolically ordered communication of affective attachments between individuals. The symbolic acts in various rites, notably blood shedding, sexual intercourse and eating of totemic animals, are all rooted in the organic aspects of human beings whilst expressive of the affective attachment and identification of individuals with each other and with the collectivity. As communication of affect, ritual is the source of the expressive symbols of blood, sex, eating and others, which are interdependent and interpenetrating with other symbolic codes to generate and regenerate shared belief and social solidarity at the level of general action system (Parsons, 1978a: 222-5) .
These other codes consist in the moral-evaluative symbolism of cultural value, the cognitive symbolism of 'categories' in the Kantian sense, and the constitutive symbolism of religious beliefs about the 'sacred' (Parsons, 1978a: 221-2) . What Parsons wishes to convey here is that the moral, the categorical and the sacred, while rightly identified by Durkheim as the indispensable foundations of social order, all have to be nevertheless articulated with and transformed into affect in order to generate social identity and solidarity. For Parsons, therefore, the relative significance Durkheim attributes to ritual over belief testifies to the strategic role not so much of religious symbolism as of affective communication in the identification of individuals and the constitution of society in the generalized sense of action system.
In resituating Durkheim's sociology of religion in a broader theoretical context of action system, Parsons in effect attributes the pattern of his own intellectual evolution to Durkheim. The following remarks on Durkheim's intellectual development are no less applicable to Parsons himself: I think it can be correctly said that Durkheim's initial focus was on society as such on the one hand and on the problem of normative order with respect to it on the other, which led him directly to the moral component, especially in his conception of moral authority. In the evolution of his thought which led to the Elementary Forms he not only, as it were, went behind his conception of the moral component in society, but he followed it to the levels of what Tillich called ultimate concerns, which were more or less explicitly religious.
If, however, this was all that he had done, it might have constituted only a reversal of his original positivistic position and a return to a relatively conventional religious point of view.
(Parsons, 1978a: 225, italics added)
Hence, while in Durkheim, as in Parsons, there is a shift away from the exclusive concern with normative order and moral value as the basis of social order, the analytical focus is now placed not so much on the sacred, religious nature of society per se as on the identity and solidarity as symbolized, generated and renewed through the ritualistic communication of affect. While a central significance of religion, in particular Christianity, may be justifiably attributed to Parsons' theory (Robertson, 1991) , it should be qualified in terms of his emphasis on the social communication of affect at the human level, which is symbolized by the religious notion of the sacred. According to Parsons, the significance of ritual symbolism, which involves the symbolization of the organic aspects of human beings (blood, sex and eating) as the sources of social affect, was recognized and yet remained theoretically unexplored in Durkheim (Parsons, 1978a: 226) . The constitution of affective meaning, which is the precondition of mutual identification and social order, could be analyzed only with reference to the level of the human condition, at which the organic, psychological, social and cultural aspects of human beings are conceived as all involved in the communication of affect.
Affect or 'love', however, figures not only in the expressive symbolism of ritual but also in the constitutive symbolism of myth. On the basis of Mauss' theory of the gift, the founding myth of redemption in early Christianity is conceptualized by Parsons in terms of 'gift of life' (cf. Parsons, 1978b: 270-5; 1978c: 300-5 ; see also Joas' [2001] excellent discussion of this notion). According to this myth, God begets His only Son as a gift of life to humanity. This act of giving, which symbolizes God's love for humanity, could not be accomplished by divine will alone but also requires the participation of the human order. It involves above all Mary's giving birth to Jesus, or in other words her gift of blood to Jesus, such that his blood is infused with both divine and human components and thereby symbolizes the unity of divine and human order. At the same time Joseph, as Jesus' 'sociological father', symbolizes the body of Jewish community and tradition to which Jesus belongs and with which he is identified.
Then in his sacrificial death Jesus gives his blood to humanity for their redemption. As the symbolic body of Jesus, the Church and its followers are identified with him, such that they could participate in his death and transcend it by sacrificing the human component of blood and flesh but sharing the divine component of the Holy Spirit infused in their soul. As reciprocation to the gift of life from God, the followers must devote their whole life to love their neighbors and God. As an expression and fulfillment of love, the death of human individuals in faith is endowed with the symbolic and sacred meaning of a gift of life to God and to humanity as a whole.
What is important to note in the symbolic logic above is that the gift of life is essentially a gift of love, or, in our sociological terminology, a communication of affect. The overall process is mediated by the symbols of blood and body, both of which are nevertheless rooted in the biological givens of human beings. On the one hand, blood symbolizes affect: God's love of human beings is mediated by Mary's giving blood to Jesus and Jesus' giving blood to humanity. On the other hand, body symbolizes social identity and solidarity: the identification of human beings with God and with each other is mediated by the body of Church and its continuity with the body of Judaic community. The communication of affect thus culminates in the giving of blood and body of Jesus and their symbolic consummation in the ritual of Eucharist, by virtue of which a community of love and faith and the religious and social identity of its members could be established and sustained.
The symbolization of affect by blood and body, however, presupposes the basic parameters of age and sex in the human condition, which refer to the birth, life course and death of human beings and the marriage tie between the two sexes, respectively. The organic entities of human blood and body could become symbols of love only if the redemption of humanity with the quasi-biological birth and death of Jesus and the reciprocation to God with the quasi-religious life and death of human beings are possible. In this light the communication of affect is at the same time a sacralization of the human condition, such that biological life and death, sexual intercourse and eating and drinking all acquire a sacred meaning in their becoming symbols of affect. The interpenetration of sacred and profane, or of the transcendental order and the human condition, is thus always mediated by the communication of affect in constituting the religious and moral foundation of social order.
But a problem then arises: does the obligation to reciprocate love remain grounded in moral and religious sources, such that the communication of affect is not self-sufficient in the generation of social solidarity even at the level of general action system? Here Parsons' conceptualization of communication of affect in terms of the gift of life is symptomatic. As have been noted, the major point of reference in this regard is Mauss' theory of gift exchange, on the basis of which Parsons identifies the reciprocal and obligatory nature of the gift as its most salient characteristic (Parsons, 1978b: 267) . But for Mauss the 'power' of a gift, that is, its imposition on the exchange partners of an obligation to give, receive and reciprocate, resides not so much in moral sanctions imposed upon the exchange as in the gift itself being a part of the 'spirit' (hau) or total personality of the giver (individual or collectivity), which as such obliges the recipient to reciprocate with his or her own gift. As Mauss puts it, If one gives things and returns them, it is because one is giving and returning 'respects' -we still say 'courtesies'. Yet it is also because by giving one is giving oneself, and if one gives oneself, it is because one 'owes' oneself -one's person and one's goods -to others.
( 1990 [1950] 46, italics original)
In other words the obligatory nature of gift exchange resides in its symbolization of self, which is constituted, communicated and reproduced in and through the reciprocal exchange process. No pre-constituted identities and values are brought by individuals into gift exchange; rather, the exchange of the gift in itself constitutes a communication of symbol, through which mutual identification of individuals is accomplished. Seen in this light, human individuals are obliged to reciprocate God's love not because of its moral and religious sanctions (which are of course important) but rather because of their identification with the person of Jesus, whose love for humanity is communicated in his gift of blood and body.
In general terms, the above considerations imply that communication of affect is 'self-referential' in the sense that it relies upon no external foundation. At the level of action system, an affective relationship could be initiated by ego utilizing and communicating anything given in the human condition as a 'gift' or symbol of affect to alter, who is thereby motivated and in this sense feels obliged to reciprocate with symbolism of affect, and accordingly initiate and engage in a social relationship with ego.
With this symptomatic reading of Parsons' notion of the 'gift of life', the relevance of communication of affect to the mutual identification of individuals, as well as its relative independence vis-à-vis institutional and normative order, on the one hand, and moral and religious order, on the other, could be readily concluded. While always interdependent and interpenetrating with the institutional and moral order, communication of affect is nevertheless the elementary mechanism by which selfhood is socially constituted and communicated in the first place. That it entails a communication of affect, rather than that of any symbol of 'difference', has to do with the necessity to motivate individuals to engage in communication and identify each other in the process.
Confucianism and the Parsonsian Problem of Order
In order to pre-empt the impression of offering an altogether idiosyncratic reinterpretation of Parsons in particular and the problem of order in general, in this section I will proceed to clarify the vantage point from which I set out to propose symbolic communication of affect as a viable 'post-normative' solution in the first place. I will demonstrate that the theme of affect is prominent in the humanistic tradition of Confucianism, which has been well recognized by China scholars and continues to impose a strong stamp upon the 'neo-Confucianism' represented by the Harvard Chinese philosopher Tu Wei-ming. 4 This cultural perspective, however, has not been elaborated into a sociological paradigm, which I argue is latent in Parsons' later theoretical system and could be rendered more explicit and properly understood with a cross-reference to Confucianism.
The introduction of Confucianism into our discussion is also intended to address a more specific theoretical issue. One may object to our interpretation of the later Parsons by pointing out that the level of human condition system entails not merely the action system as well as the organic system that constitutes the basis of affective symbols, but also a telic system that exercises cybernetic control over the action system in its transcendental ordering of meaning (Parsons, 1978e) . In other words, the meaning pertaining to the level of human action must be grounded on a transcendental order that is given, in the Kantian sense, to human beings. It implies that social order could not emerge out of the communication, affective or otherwise, among human individuals alone, but rather necessitates an 'other-reference' to an idealistic order (Habermas, 1987: 249-56) .
To be sure, such counterargument has a certain merit. The tension between idealism and humanism in Parsons' last theory of the human condition is undeniable in light of the problematic relationship between the telic system and other human subsystems. While our interpretation may be defended by pointing out that the constitution of meaning and human individuals must be always mediated by the communication of affect, the element of transcendentalism in Parsons' theory could not be easily discarded. It necessitates that we further elaborate the theme of Confucianism that is touched upon in Parsons' discussion of affect and yet remains underestimated in its general-theoretical significance. Against the humanistic overtone of Confucianism, the peculiar cultural orientation of Christianity underlying Parsons' transcendentalism could be put in a proper perspective.
We have noted that for Parsons the code of affect refers to an integrative standard that may be specified as Confucian 'harmony' and Christian 'love'. The Confucian ideal of harmony referred to by Parsons could be further specified as chung-yung ( , or zhongyong in the pinyin system), that is, 'commonality and centrality' (Tu, 1989) . The rationality of chung-yung consists in an orientation of action towards the imperative of maintaining harmony and reconciling conflict in concrete courses of social interaction. Echoing Parsons, some Chinese scholars have suggested that chung-yung could constitute a 'missing link' between valuerationality and instrumental rationality by virtue of its integrative nature (Cheung et al., 2003: 117) . What remains unproblematized in this account, however, is the affective grounding of chung-yung in the relationship between father and son. Though biologically rooted, the primordial tie between father and son acquires a symbolic meaning of affection by virtue of the expression of filial piety (hsiao ) by the son towards his father. What filiality entails is a continuation not so much of the bloodline as of the will of father, which symbolizes the tradition passed down by ancestors to their biological and cultural descendants (Tu, 1989: 42) .
In contrast to the gift of life from God to humanity, which connotes equality and universal love of neighbor, the continuation of life from ancestor to descendant implies a hierarchical and particularistic relationship. For Confucianism, affective feeling must be cultivated in the first place in a personalized and kinship-based (including quasi-kinship) relationship if it is to be intense and profound (Tu, 1989: 51-2) . But at the same time the particularistic affection towards primary group and intimate circle must be progressively broadened and generalized into a universal (yet graduated) love and respect of humanity and 'all under Heaven' (tien-hsia ). In this light, jen, as the Confucian notion of love of humanity sanctioned by chung-yung, is no less affectionately charged than Christian love, though there is no reference to any transcendental conception of God over and apart from the realm of human social relationship.
With regard to the identification and constitution of the individual through affect, we should recognize that for Confucianism the cultivation of affectionate feeling towards others is at the same time self-cultivation. In much the same way as the gift of life in the Christian tradition, in which the gift constitutes part of the personality of the giver that obliges reciprocation from the recipient, in Confucianism the continuation of life is essentially an obligatory continuation of the personality of ancestor (both lineal and cultural) on the part of the descendant. The Confucian saying that 'jen ( , "love of humanity") means jen ( , "personhood")' indicates the constitutive significance of affect in self-identification (Tu, 1989: 50) . Conversely, only a cultivated person (chun-tzu ) is capable of practicing jen and chung-yung in his or her everyday life. The symbols of affect in the Confucian tradition, as exposited above, consist primarily in procreation and ancestral worship, both of which being grounded in the generational (rather than individual life-course) dimension of age and sex in the human condition. Procreation is not biological reproduction per se but rather a symbol of the continuation and transmission of cultural ideals exemplified by ancestors and sages (Tu, 1989: 45) . On the other hand, the ceremonial rituals in ancestral worship signify respect of the old and honor of the dead, which are moral and affective attitudes indispensable for the formation of social identity and solidarity (Tu, 1989: 48) .
The general significance of affect in Confucianism could be further substantiated if we turn to the Book of Rites (Li Chi ), which contains the earliest treatises on ritual and ceremonial prescriptions in ancient China and constitutes one of the five foundational texts of Confucianism. According to the canonical book, propriety (li ) refers to the code of conduct for various rites and ceremonies as well as everyday interaction. Both the origin and function of propriety, however, reside in the symbolic communication of affect at the level of the human condition:
What are the feelings of men? They are joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking. . . . The things which men greatly desire are comprehended in meat and drink and sexual pleasure; those which they greatly dislike are comprehended in death, exile, poverty, and suffering. Thus liking and disliking are the great elements in men's minds. But men keep them hidden in their minds, where they cannot be fathomed or measured. The good and the bad of them being in their minds, and no outward manifestation of them being visible, if it be wished to determine these qualities in one uniform way, how can it be done without the use of the rules of propriety (implied in the ceremonial usages)? (Book of Rites, Book VII, Section II, (19) (20) Also consistent with Parsons' theory of affective communication is the theme of the gift and its obliged reciprocation in Confucian propriety:
And what the rules of propriety value is that reciprocity. If I give a gift and nothing comes in return, that is contrary to propriety; if the thing comes to me, and I give nothing in return, that also is contrary to propriety.
(Book of Rites, Book I, Section I, Part I, 6.23)
In light of the above considerations I would like to propose that the Confucian problem of order, which entails the harmonization of social identities with the cultivation and expression of affect towards forefathers, converges in principle with the late Parsonsian problem of order, which is essentially a secularized, sociological inquiry into the possibility of founding 'the Kingdom of God on Earth' through universal love or brotherhood. Complementary to the associational emphasis of the Christian and Parsonsian formulation, the Confucian conception of affect highlights its fiduciary nature. 5 Be that as it may, the connotation of affective identification with and attachment to community is much the same.
The general-theoretical significance of complementing and elaborating the Parsonsian problem of order with the Confucian one resides in the latter's unambiguous identification of affect as the humanistic foundation of social order. For Confucianism, transcendental beliefs and values (and their institutionalization) are never meaningful and functional apart from their promotion of the affectionate engagement of individuals in 'secular' or ordinary human relationships (lun ). The Confucian model of social order thus goes beyond the normative solution in its greater flexibility towards institutionalized rules and laws, such that social harmony and order is taken to be best safeguarded not with a strict adherence to these rules, but rather with a principled allowance of possible exceptions in favor of proper conduct in the concrete context of human relationships and interaction (Edgerton, 1985: 16-22) . The propriety (li) of conduct in turn consists in nothing but the practicing of 'love' or jen, which thereby assumes a priority over conformity to moral and institutionalized values in the maintenance of social harmony and solidarity.
At a more generalized level, even the quasi-religious 'Unity of Man and Heaven' (tien jen he yi ), which is the Confucian ideal par excellence, presupposes the affective and thereby sacred nature of humanity, and is therefore conceivable and realizable only with the affectionate commitment of human individuals to secular communal life (Tang, 1977: 291-3) . To quote the Book of Rites again:
From all this it follows that rules of propriety must be traced to their origins in the Grand Unity. . . . While the rules of ceremony have their origin in heaven, the movement of them reaches to earth. The distribution of them extends to all the business [of life]. They change with the seasons; they agree in reference to the [variations of] lot and condition. In regard to man, they serve to nurture [his nature]. They are practiced by means of offerings, acts of strength, words and postures of courtesy, in eating and drinking, in the observances of capping, marriage, mourning, sacrificing, archery, chariot-driving, audiences, and friendly missions.
(Book of Rites, Book VII, Section III, 4-5)
Hence, even when Confucianism conceives of the 'Grand Unity' of metaphysical, natural and human order, it is held to inhere in various concrete instances of propriety or symbolically mediated communication of affect in ordinary social life (of which rituals and ceremonies constitute an integral part).
Compared with the Christian tradition to which Parsons belongs, which revolves around the idea of an other-worldly God or transcendental order, the this-worldly emphasis of Confucianism on social and affective relationship may better serve as an antidote to any possible reification of normative, expressive or other loci of culture as the other-foundation of human social order, as well as its mirror image of a free-floating, anti-humanistic self-referential order. 6 According to the Confucian perspective, social communication of affect is the ultimate source of moral and transcendental order rather than the other way round. While such a perspective is at odds with Parsons' transcendentalism, its humanism is nevertheless more consistent with his reinterpretation of Durkheim's theory of ritual in terms of symbolic communication of affect as well as the prominent role he assigns to affect in the constitution of social order.
Conclusion
To recapitulate Parsons' 'last theory' of social order in pointed contrast to both his original normative solution and the alternative that Luhmann proposes, we may assert that, for Parsons, the constitution of meaning, including expressive, moral and even religious symbolism, could not be presumed as ensuing unproblematically and automatically from the pre-existing normative and institutional structure or the self-resolution of double contingency. Rather, social meaning is evolved in the course of mutual recognition, in which human beings enlist their anthropological givens as symbols to mark themselves off from the environment and end the indeterminacy arising from their social encounter. To answer the question posed and yet unresolved by Pizzorno, the motivation to end double contingency could be secured only by the communication of affect, through which individuals identify each other as the members of a moral and affective community. Cultural values and other sources of meaning should not be conceived as given a priori; rather, their emergence or constitution must be analyzed in terms of the process of affective communication that they presuppose.
On the basis of our preceding analysis, a general and single 'postnormative' solution could be proposed to the problem of order: communication of affect and its institutionalization. To paraphrase the Durkheimian notion of 'pre-contractual foundation of contract', we may conceive affect as the preinstitutional foundation of institutional order. As the process of mutual identification and constitution of human individuals, communication of affect analytically precedes conflict of self-interests and its ensuing normative and institutional regulation. In much the same way as the late Durkheim, who recognizes that normative and institutional order is always instituted by human beings themselves (Poggi, 1972: 237-9) , the late Parsons re-specifies the voluntaristic nature of social order in terms of the active and affective involvement of human actors. 7 A social order could be 'self-referential' only in the sense that it presupposes nothing but the human individuals who are constituted in and through communication. But for this to be possible, a symbol of the eagerness and motivation of individuals to identify each other as 'worthy' (in the sense intended by Hobbes and Pizzorno) members of the same community is necessary to initiate and sustain the communication process.
Following Parsons, we define this symbol as affect, which is social and relational rather than cultural and psychological in nature.
Affect is a social and relational category in the sense that its communication does not dictate any pre-constituted and essentialized attribute of human individuals save their being social animals standing in relation to each other. In this vein Parsons' reference to the human condition does not entail any substantive assumptions concerning human nature; rather, it is the symbolic and communicative function of the human condition, or specifically its potential capacity to symbolize affection, that must be presupposed in the communication of affect and thereby the constitution of social order. In contrast to the theoretical anti-humanism of Luhmann, for whom human beings appear merely as black boxes to each other, for Parsons affect is at once symbolic and existential, such that the symbolic representation and communication of affect is always a contingent and emergent outcome that must be constantly regenerated in the social existence of human beings.
The social character of affect could not be overemphasized, as it underlies the integrative function of affect at the level of the general action system. Affect is integrative as it involves an interpenetration between cultural and psychological elements of the action system. The constitutive, moral, cognitive and any symbolic element of the cultural system must be articulated with the motivation of human individuals to identify and communicate in order to constitute the affective elements of social system. For Parsons as for Durkheim, the very fact that the human being is a social animal implies that there must be an affective foundation and significance of morality, the sacred and any collective representation, no matter how significant these symbolic elements are in the constitution of concrete social order.
At the end of this article I will attempt to draw some possible implications of the late Parsonsian theory of affect for the analysis of modern social order. One perennial issue in this regard has been the problem of how the bipolar and oppositional characteristics of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft could be overcome and reconciled in a modern context. In terms of our analytical framework the problem could be restated as one concerning the generalization of affect in the modern, civic type of order, a process in which the dialectical tension between affectivity and civility is problematic.
The constitution of modern society entails the forging of civil, that is, impersonal, albeit trustful, ties among autonomous individuals, which presupposes a certain level of attenuation of the ascriptive and traditional context under which interpersonal communication of affect normally takes place. Without the foundation of the latter, however, civil society would be cut off from a minimum of social solidarity that is the prerequisite of any group formation. While some sociologists contend that the problem of extending the loci of solidarity from primordial to civil ties could be readily resolved (Geertz, 1973; Shils, 1975 ; see also Carter, 1998) , the persistent tension between affectivity and civility continues to lurk behind most sociological analysis, in particular the historical sociology of the self-restraint of affect in the civilizing process (Elias, 1994) , as well as contemporary researches on the disturbing resurgence of ethnicity and nationalism in post-Communist Eastern Europe (see, e.g., Wesolowski, 1995) .
Without venturing to offer a conclusive solution to this long-standing puzzle, I would seek to clarify how Parsons' later theory of affect may shed light upon the mechanism through which affect could be generalized to constitute the very foundation of civil society. Here the major point of reference is Parsons' analysis of the modern university system, which is conceived not only in its institutional structure but also in the general process of action involved, namely cognition (Parsons and Platt, 1973) . By conceptualizing the university as a 'cognitive complex', that is, a process of action that involves the production of cognitive culture under a specific institutional framework, its latent function of socializing students into responsible citizens is problematized. In a university the students (and professors) may not only stand in affective relationship with each other, as in peer group solidarities, but may also learn to generalize their loyalty and commitment to the wider public through the universalistic and associational mode of interaction in university learning (and teaching). Together with the knowledge, competence and intelligence they acquire, the moral value and cultural capacity of a responsible citizenry could be transmitted to the students. The modern university thus performs the fiduciary function of transmitting and maintaining civic culture, such that it constitutes one indispensable social condition of citizenship. 8 The underlying theoretical assumption in this perspective is that a civic type of social order is possible only if there is a 'rational' (read: integrative rather than zweckrational or wertrational) allocation of affect and its corresponding level of loyalty and commitment by social members over various collectivities with which they identify. In our case, the students may learn to generalize their investment of affect in particular persons and solidarities to their fellow citizens only if the latent socialization in higher education is successful. Accordingly, what Parsons in effect argues here is that civic education in real, concrete social life is possible not only within the setting of voluntary association (Putnam, 1993 (Putnam, , 2000 but also in university, which serves as a fiduciary association maintaining the commitment to cognitive learning, on the one hand, and promoting associational life and civic culture, on the other. 9 At this juncture it is possible to broaden our scope of inquiry from the modern Western context to the Chinese one. As long as higher learning is concerned, the Confucian tradition of learning is oriented to cultivation rather than cognition per se. In other words, while the development of the university in the West has generally incorporated the active participation of common people in the production of knowledge and the creation of culture (Turner, 1989 ; see also Parsons, 1971: 94-8) , in China higher learning remains as the arena where the people is cultivated by intellectual elites to become the collective bearer and guardian of culture.
In this regard it would be interesting to articulate the possible relationship of a cultivational (rather than cognitive) complex of cultural action to the generalization of affect in societal community. In particular, questions pertaining to civility and civic culture could be addressed. The fixation of loyalty and commitment to kinship and local ties and thereby the general lack of civic consciousness and engagement among the Chinese people is an academic and practical issue that has agonized many China scholars and intellectuals (see, e.g., Fei, 1992) . In this context the Parsonsian problematic leads us to question whether there has ever been any counterpart of fiduciary association in China that may facilitate the formation of a modern civic order, and in what ways the cultural priority of cultivation over cognition would shape the nature and prospect of such an association.
Along this line of thought a problem for further exploration could be tentatively formulated. In comparative and historical terms, the early Christian Church was the prototype of fiduciary association in the West, which in its religious theme of the gift of life/love as well as its emphasis on intellectual inquiry and associational life underlay the cultural and institutional innovation of the modern university system (Parsons, 1971: 29ff.) . On the other hand, in China the traditional loci of learning in official colleges (shu-yuan ) came to be displaced by study associations (hsueh-hui ), which proliferated during the late Imperial reform era (1890s-1910s) as a response to political and cultural modernization.
A feasible research topic is therefore to inquire into the structure and function of these study associations with regard to their possible contribution to the prototypical formation of modern, civic order in China. As demonstrated by historical record, in late Imperial China a stratum of Westernized intellectuals adopted the study association as the institutional milieu by which to unite and inculcate the people into a virtuous citizenry (min ), and in this way to strengthen the nation against imperialist invasions. What is noteworthy for our purpose is the reference to the theme of love or affect: one prominent intellectual talked explicitly about the 'power of love' (ai-li ) underlying associational life (Price, 1997) . While associations in the late Imperial reform era should not be taken as a full-fledged 'civil society' in the Western sense, and they differ from the modern university in their emphasis on cultivation rather than cognition, in accordance with our Parsonsian perspective, we may still ask whether they may function as fiduciary associations facilitating the formation of civic culture, and what may be the structural and historical dynamics governing the fortune of this peculiar Chinese civic tradition. A more detailed comparative-historical and cultural analysis would be able to shed light upon how generalized and in this sense 'civilized' order of affect is possible in different cultural and political contexts.
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1.
For a more extended discussion of the 'theorem' of double contingency in Parsons and Luhmann, see Vanderstraeten (2002) .
2.
The motif of mutual recognition is prominent not merely in Hobbes' work but also in the debate on civil society in the Scottish enlightenment, with which classical economics is closely intertwined. For an elaboration of this theme, see Seligman (1992) .
3.
It is the rationale behind Parsons' assignment of affect rather than the definition of the situation as the symbolic medium of social system, though the latter obviously also involves a moral and evaluative element.
4.
For a general discussion of the significance of affect or 'human-heartedness' in the formation of Confucianism, see Fung (1988) . For a brief introduction to the development of neo-Confucianism, see Liu (2003) .
5.
This aspect is highlighted by Tu when he speaks of 'fiduciary community' as the image of ideal society in Confucianism (Tu, 1989: 39ff.) . More discussion of the notion of 'fiduciary' can be found below.
6.
For the anti-humanism in Luhmann's theory of self-referential system, see Luhmann (1995: 215ff.) .
7.
Indeed one of the analytical conclusions in The Structure of Social Action is that the element of normative orientation in unit act derives its subjective and normative status by virtue of the value attitude invested by the actor towards value standards.
8.
Here 'fiduciary' refers to the maintenance, transmission and production of cultural tradition. For a more detailed discussion of this notion, see Parsons (1965) .
9.
It is noteworthy that Parsons once identifies both socialization in fiduciary institution and associational life as the constitutive conditions of societal community in general (Parsons, 1977d: 386) .
